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COMMENT
Applying the Absolute Priority Rule to Nonprofit
Enterprises in Bankruptcy
With the explosion of the nonprofit sector in recent years,' courts have
struggled to adapt bankruptcy law-normally applied in the context of
individuals and businesses'- to the context of nonprofit insolvency.' One area
of confusion has been the absolute priority rule in section 11294 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code.' The rule provides a way for courts to confirm a debtor's
1. For example, the real assets and revenues of the nonprofit sector have more than tripled
since the 197os. See Lester M. Salamon, America's Nonprofit Sector: A Primer, reprinted in
JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN ScHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 17, 17 (3d ed. 20o6).
2. See, e.g., In re Gen. Teamsters, 265 F.3d 869, 873 (9th Cir. 2OOl) ("The absolute priority rule
is generally applied to for-profit corporations facing bankruptcy .... ").
3. Despite the central role nonprofit organizations play in American economic, social, and
religious life, even their basic characteristics are commonly misunderstood. For instance, the
term "nonprofit" is deceptive because nonprofits are actually allowed by law to earn profits.
See Jill R. Horwitz, Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 144 (2007).
What they may not do is engage in private inurement -that is, their earnings may not be
passed along to individuals in their private capacity. This limitation, known as the
"nondistribution constraint," is perhaps the most salient distinction between nonprofit and
for-profit enterprise. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J.
835, 838 (198o); see also I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (granting federal income tax exemptions
to "[c]orporations ... organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific
... or educational purposes... no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is
carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation ... and which does
not participate in, or intervene in... any political campaign").
4. 11 U.S.C. § 112 9 (b)(2)(B)(ii) (2000). For an overview of the history and public policies
associated with the absolute priority rule, see generally John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute
PriorityAfterAhlers, 87MICH.L. REV. 963 (1989).
5. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532.
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reorganization Plan over the objection of an impaired class of creditors,6
thereby preserving the going-concern value of a firm in the face of creditor
demands for liquidation.
Section 1129 states that in order for a Plan to be confirmed by cram down,7
"the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of [the impaired]
class [must] not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior
claim or interest any property."8 In other words, not one cent may be received
by a junior class of claimants until the class of creditors ahead of it has been
repaid in full.9 This provision furthers several related policy goals, including
the maintenance of a hierarchy of claims to priority between the various classes
of debt and equity interests," the protection of each class of interests against
collusion by the other classes," and the safeguarding of public investors from
insider dealing. 2
Courts have puzzled over the bankruptcy implications of a certain subtle
distinction between for-profit and nonprofit organizations. Namely, the typical
residual claimant in a business is an equity holder, whereas a junior interest in
6. A class of creditors is said to be impaired unless a debtor's Plan leaves unaltered the
creditors' legal, equitable, and contractual rights (often meaning that the creditors are to be
repaid the full amount of their allowed claims) or the Plan otherwise meets certain specific
requirements. See id. § 1124.
7. The term "cram down" refers to a Plan that is being confirmed over the dissent of an
impaired class-that is, the Plan is being "crammed down" the creditors' throats. See
Richard I. Aaron, Hooray for Gibberish! A Glossary of Bankruptcy Slang for the Occasional
Practitioner or Bewildered Judge, 3 DEPAUL Bus. &CoM. L.J. 141, 150-51 (2005).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 112 9 (b)(2)(B)(ii).
9. See Omer Tene, Revisiting the Creditors' Bargain: The Entitlement to the Going-Concern Surplus
in Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 19 BANKR. DEV. J. 287, 320 (2003). Notice, however,
that this priority rule is an "absolute" requirement only if the Plan has not already obtained
the approval of all classes in the reorganization. Ralph A. Peeples, Staying In: Chapter ii,
Close Corporations and the Absolute Priority Rule, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 75 (1989).
io. G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. & Mike Sigal, Competitive Choice Theory and the Broader Implications of
the Supreme Court's Analysis in Bank of America v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 54
Bus. LAW. 1475, 1488 (1999).
ii. See id.
12. For example, managers may have firm-specific skills or other forms of leverage that allow
them to extract special concessions from senior creditors, such as better equity positions in
the reorganized firm than they would be entitled to according to their preexisting interests.
Meanwhile, public investors whose preexisting interests were comparable to those of the
insiders might see their claims completely extinguished. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H.
Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 738, 740-41 (1988).
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a nonprofit usually is not regarded as "equity."13 This contrast raises the
question of how to apply the absolute priority rule to Plans in which the pre-
petition interest holders of a nonprofit (usually its directors or members) retain
control of, and thus an interest in, the reorganized, post-petition debtor. 4 An
equity holder of a similarly situated business debtor would not be permitted to
retain such an interest."
A doctrinal split has emerged, revealing two conflicting judicial approaches.
Courts of the Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have concluded that old
interest holders of a nonprofit are permitted to control it throughout its
reorganization process, reasoning that the operational limitations inherent to
nonprofits render the absolute priority rule effectively irrelevant.' 6 On the
other hand, courts of the First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have not inferred
any inevitability about nonprofit compliance with absolute priority, applying
13. See, e.g., Osborn v. Univ. Med. Assocs. of the Med. Univ. of S.C., No. 2-01-4002-18, 2003
WL 25734356, at "i (D.S.C. Sept. 11, 2003) ("[P]laintiff has conceded that a private
individual may not possess an ownership interest in a nonprofit entity ... "); In re Gen.
Teamsters, 225 B.R. 719, 736 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1998) ("Control alone, [such as occurs in the
nonprofit context,] divorced from any right to share in corporate profits or assets, does not
amount to an equity interest."); see also. Knollwood Mem'l Gardens v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 764,
786 (1966) (stating that the Internal Revenue Code's tax exemption for nonprofits should
be denied to any organization in which the "individuals share in the corporate profits
because of equity interests"); Semple Sch. for Girls v. Boyland, 126 N.E.2d 294, 297 (N.Y.
1955) (denying a tax exemption to a nonprofit on the basis that it had allowed an individual
to assume "the position of the holder of an equity interest in the enterprise").
14. See In re Wabash Valley Power Ass'n, 72 F.3d 1305, 1313 ( 7th Cit. 1995) ("The difficulty in
resolving the absolute priority problem in the case before us primarily reflects the unusual
structure of the entities involved.... The corporation undergoing bankruptcy is a not-for-
profit ... ").
15. But this prohibition does not apply in very limited circumstances, such as when a new value
contribution is offered. See infra note 45.
16. See, e.g., In re Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 282 B.R. 444, 453 (B.A.P. 9 th Cit. 2002)
("[T]he Hospital's nonprofit status puts creditors in an unusually disadvantaged
negotiating position because they are not able to assert the Bankruptcy Code's absolute
priority rule to block unacceptable plans .... "); In re Wabash, 72 F.3d at 132o ("Control of
the cooperative provides no opportunity, either currently or in the future, for the Members
to obtain profits or any equity in Wabash's assets and control itself is not an equity
interest."); In re Whittaker Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 149 B.R. 812, 816 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993)
("The [board of trustees] retaining control over the debtor entity does not give them
anything .... Clearly, there is no distribution to this group and nothing beyond control that
passes to it. Being a Virginia nonstock corporation places it in a unique status apart from
private enterprise.").
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the rule on fact-specific grounds to reject reorganization Plans that allowed old
interests to be preserved.' 7
This Comment proposes a framework that courts can utilize for
systematically adjudicating absolute priority claims in nonprofit bankruptcies.
Specifically, nonprofits may be classified along a continuum depending upon
the particular type of interest they assign to directors and members: those that
have an "entrepreneurial" structure mark one end of the continuum, and those
that have a "mutual" structure mark the other end."8 Part I of this Comment
describes entrepreneurial nonprofits and explains why their directors and
members should be able to conform with the absolute priority rule and yet
maintain an interest in the nonprofit through a Plan confirmed by cram down.
The second half of Part I elucidates the features of mutual nonprofits, whose
directors and members enjoy equity-like interests that courts should not allow
them to retain through cram down. Part II then provides guidance for courts
faced with structurally ambiguous cases, highlighting additional contextual
and policy factors that can be used to decide whether a bankrupt nonprofit's
17. See, e.g., S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 252 B.R. 373, 386-89
(E.D. Tex. 2o0o) (holding that certain technical characteristics of patronage stock qualified
it as property that the debtor's members could not retain through reorganization); In re E.
Me. Elec. Coop., Inc., 125 B.R. 329, 338-40 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991) (same); In re S.A.B.T.C.
Townhouse Ass'n, 152 B.R. loo5, loll (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that a substantial
asymmetry between the market value and the "value in use" of the debtor's real estate was
insufficient to overcome the absolute priority conflict raised by the membership's post-
petition retention of the property).
is. These nonprofit categories, defined in further detail in Part I, were first articulated by Henry
Hansmann in his highly influential contribution to the scholarship on nonprofit
organization. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980).
The distinction is part of what has been described as a "famous typology" of nonprofits,
David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. RaV. 531, 538 n.24 (20o6),
proposed in an article that constitutes a "cornerstone of the law of nonprofit organizations,"
Gail A. Lasprogata & Marya N. Cotten, Contemplating "Enterprise": The Business and Legal
Challenges of Social Entrepreneurship, 41 AM. Bus. L.J. 67, 74 & n.34 (2003). Indeed, at least
one Supreme Court Justice has credited Hansmann with providing the "leading theory" of
nonprofit enterprise. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 675 n.6 (199o)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
Critics of Hansmann's nonprofit law scholarship suggest that his conceptualization is
inconsistent with the history of charitable exemptions. See, e.g., Mark. A. Hall & John D.
Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379, 1387
(1991). Others note that he fails to properly account for the role of altruism. See, e.g., Rob
Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REv. 5Ol, 519-66 (199o). And
others suggest that he inaccurately treats as alike all customers, donors, and other actors in
the nonprofit sector. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman, Another Theory of Nonprofit Corporations, 8o
MICH. L. REv. 999, 999-1OO (1982). The entrepreneurial-mutual distinction, however, has
not been a focal point of these debates.
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reorganization Plan should be prohibited. In summary, this Comment suggests
a way for courts to assess whether a particular nonprofit is able to abuse the
Chapter ii process in the way that section 1129 was designed to prevent.
I. THE ENTREPRENEURIAL-MUTUAL CONTINUUM
Nonprofit entities can be categorized as having primarily an
"entrepreneurial" or primarily a "mutual" structure. '9 By analogizing a
nonprofit to one of the ideal types anchoring this continuum, courts can more
readily identify violations of the absolute priority rule and thus better
harmonize the charitable goals of nonprofits with the public policy goals of the
bankruptcy system.
A. Entrepreneurial Nonprofits
The classic entrepreneurial nonprofit-such as a public hospital, museum,
or national charity - is controlled by a board of directors (or similar
management group) whose members do not comprise the nonprofit's own
patrons.2' In other words, an entrepreneurial organization is characterized by
the self-perpetuating nature and independence of its board; its directors do not
substantially benefit from the charitable or social mission of the nonprofit that
they operate.
An entrepreneurial structure, in light of statutory textual and contextual
considerations, can be construed as a signal to courts that there is no conflict
between the insolvent nonprofit's Plan and the requirements of absolute
priority.22 First, board members and trustees of entrepreneurial nonprofits
control the organization but receive no "property" under section 1129 by virtue
of that control.2 3 The interest of any nonprofit director, whether
entrepreneurial or mutual, is sharply limited by the nondistribution
constraint' imposed upon all nonprofits; in an entrepreneurial structure,
however, the successful fulfillment of the organization's mission provides no
special benefit to its directors -that is, no more than it might provide to any
19. See Hansmann, supra note 18, at 841-42.
20. Id. at 842.
21. Id. at 841.
22. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the legislative history surrounding the use of the term "property" in
section 1129, see infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
24. See supra note 3.
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other outside party in the greater community. This is quite unlike the effect of
a controlling interest in a business firm, which is valuable for its future
economic potential even when the firm becomes insolvent 5
The trend, in fact, is for entrepreneurial nonprofits to select board
members who they think might contribute resources to the organization, such
as money or expertise. 6 This is not to suggest that there are no privileges
arising from a board position; such position at a prominent charity may
enhance one's managerial experience, generate publicity, and provide the
opportunity to build a unique network of professional contacts. Nevertheless,
these sorts of benefits are not easily valued, not transferable to creditors
through liquidation, and thus not of the nature that Congress intended section
1129 to address.2 7
Second, allowing entrepreneurial debtors to enjoy post-confirmation
control would not undermine the original purposes behind section 1129. For
example, there is no real threat that the board members of an entrepreneurial
nonprofit will collude with secured creditors to squeeze out a class of
unsecured creditors." Because there is no profit sharing or asset distribution
that arises out of the control of an entrepreneurial nonprofit, the directors have
little reason to arrange an unfair financial transaction that preserves their
stake. 9
Similarly, another purpose of the absolute priority rule is to protect public
investors from "insider" managers who own large quantities of stock or who
are otherwise inherently better positioned to advocate for their interests.3" The
risk of this insider dealing is mild in the context of an entrepreneurial nonprofit
insolvency. A nonprofit, of course, has no public investors of the kind involved
with a commercial firm, but even more relevantly, entrepreneurial directors do
25. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 208 (1988).
a6. See BOARDSOURCE, NONPROFIT GovERNANCE INDEX 2007, at 6 (2007),
http://www.boardsource.org/dl.asp?document id= 553 (finding in its survey of charitable
organizations that 68% require board members to make a personal contribution to the
charity and 74% of board members do indeed make such contributions).
27. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
28. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913) (determining that an equity receivership
sale was an impermissible transfer of assets orchestrated by bondholders and stockholders
to extinguish certain unsecured claims); see also Ayer, supra note 4, at 969-73 (explaining the
historical background and policy rationales of the absolute priority rule).
2g. But see infra note 31.
30. Management also has the exclusive right to propose a Plan for at least the first 12o days of
reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2000). Outside shareholders and creditors may not
propose competing Plans during that period. This advantage alone gives management a
considerable amount of leverage over the other players in the reorganization process.
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not share in the goods and services that their organizations are operated to
provide. They therefore possess no incentive or natural medium through which
to allocate those goods and services to themselves at the expense of outside
patrons or creditors.3'
B. Mutual Nonprofits
In recent years, the nonprofit sector has expanded rapidly and nonprofits
have taken on more qualities of traditional commercial enterprises.32 One
aspect of this phenomenon is a rise in the number of mutual nonprofits, such
as cooperatives, 33 homeowners' associations, and country clubs.34 Mutual
nonprofits are characterized by members or patrons who control the
organization themselves.3" The duties of the governing board, therefore, still
run to the fulfillment of a charitable or social mission, but the board members,
in turn, are direct beneficiaries of that mission . 6 They maintain what can be
called an equity-like interest in the entity, the retention of which should be
characterized as a receipt of property in violation of the Code's cram down
regulations.
31. Of course, this assumes that the directors are complying with their fiduciary duties.
Nonprofit directors are constrained by fiduciary duties to the donors whose donations make
their operations possible, by fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the nonprofit itself, and
by the various requirements of their corporate charter or the Internal Revenue Code. See
Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400 (1998). To the extent
that directors violate their duties and inappropriately manage the nonprofit's resources for
their own gain, even the directors of an entrepreneurial nonprofit may be seen to violate
certain policy goals of section 1129. Nevertheless, these atypical situations are more
appropriately addressed by enforcement of (or modifications to) corporate fiduciary law and
nonprofit law than by indirect means through the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Frances R.
Hill, Targeting Exemption for Charitable Efficiency: Designing a Nondiversion Constraint, 56
SMU L. REv. 675 (2003) (questioning the merits of continued tax exemption for
organizations that appear to be diverting a high proportion of resources from activities that
serve tax-exempt purposes to activities that have, at best, an attenuated relationship with
such purposes).
32. See Horwitz, supra note 3, at 152-53; Jeff Kosseff, Unclear Bankruptcy Rules Challenge Catholics
and Disciples, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Aug. 10, 2004, at 12, 13.
33. Note that in some states, cooperatives are. incorporated under statutes separate from the
state's nonprofit or nonstock corporation statutes. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 185.Ol-.996
(West 2002). As a result, those cooperatives do not receive the benefits of tax exemption
under I.R.C. § 5o1(c)(3) and are not subject to the nondistribution constraint of nonprofit
status. Only nonprofit cooperatives are the subject of the discussion here.
34. Hansmann, supra note 18, at 842.
35. Id. at 841.
36. See id. at 89o-91.
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Congress intended for the term "property" in section 1129 to be given a
broad interpretation,37 though its scope is not endless. 8 The legislative history
of the Code states, "As used throughout this subsection, 'property' includes
both tangible and intangible property .... "" This legislative history suggests
that Congress did not want the word's interpretation to be limited only to real
property and standard commercial instruments. At the same time, Congress
did not want to prohibit the retention of even the most ancillary, personalized
advantages only vaguely linked to a pre-petition interest, thereby creating an
exception that effectively swallowed the cram down rule. 40 Accordingly,
benefits such as the publicity and prestige that accrue to the director of an
entrepreneurial nonprofit- benefits that cannot be easily monetized or
transferred-need not be regulated by section 1129. On the other hand, post-
reorganization control of a mutual nonprofit constitutes preservation of an
equity-like interest that should not be enjoyed by directors at the expense of
creditors.
The control of a mutual nonprofit is itself a "consumption item of value" ;41
because of the way the organization is structured, control allows directors and
members to enjoy concrete financial benefits. Although these benefits are not
packaged as conventional equity instruments like stock dividends or capital
gains, they include such opportunities as guaranteed discounts on purchased
goods and services," shares of appreciated patronage capital,43 and interests in
appreciated real estate. 44 Providing additional evidence that these privileges
are, indeed, "property" of the sort the Code administers, interest holders in
37. See 124 CONG. REC. S17, 4 21 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (noting
that the term "property" should be "used in its broadest sense").
38. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 413-14 (1977) (implying through various statements that
property must be monetizeable, including the statements that "property is to be valued as of
the effective date of the [P]lan" and that "a valuation will almost always be required under
section 112 9 (b) in order to determine the value of the consideration to be distributed under
the [P]ilan"); 124 CONG. REC. S17,42o-21 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (implying that "property"
under section 1129 must be of the nature that is alienable, or at least monetizeable).
39. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 413.
40. See supra note 38.
41. See Hansmann, supra note 18, at 891.
42. E.g., S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 252 B.R. 373, 377 (E.D. Tex.
2000).
43. E.g., In reE. Me. Elec. Coop., Inc., 125 B.R. 329, 339 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991).
44. E.g., In re S.A.B.T.C. Townhouse Ass'n, 152 B.R. 1005 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
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mutual nonprofit debtors have been willing to offer cash contributions in
exchange for their continued access to these financial opportunities. 41
Finally, the incentive structure faced by the board members of a mutual
nonprofit is akin to that of corporate executives or principal corporate
shareholders: the directors have both an incentive and a medium through
which to self-deal at the expense of creditors and other interest holders.46 For
these reasons, in a Plan confirmed by cram down, courts should determine
whether the entity in question qualifies as a mutual nonprofit, and if so, forbid
the pre-petition interest holders of the organization from retaining their
interests unless the more senior classes of creditors are paid in full.
II. ADJUDICATING STRUCTURALLY AMBIGUOUS CASES
Some nonprofits may be particularly difficult to classify as predominantly
entrepreneurial or mutual based solely on organizational features.47 For
instance, consider that a board of trustees of a university might be structured
so that exactly half of its members are selected from students and alumni (who
constitute the nonprofit's patrons) and half are independent and
self-perpetuating. 4s Or, in other situations, courts might feel that a nonprofit's
location along the entrepreneurial-mutual continuum inadequately reflects the
actual gravity of absolute priority conflicts raised by its proposed Plan. This
may arise when patron-directors exercise disproportionately more power over
the organization than their representation on the board would suggest, or
when an entrepreneurial nonprofit reveals future plans to transition toward a
more mutual configuration. This Comment outlines other legal and policy
considerations that should guide courts in applying absolute priority doctrine
in such cases, in which structural factors are not dispositive. These
45. See In re Wabash Valley Power Ass'n, 72 F.3d 1305 (7th Cir. 1995). In fact, an entire legal
doctrine, known as the "new value corollary" or the "new value exception" to the absolute
priority rule, has been developed to deal with situations in which existing interest holders
are willing to make new capital contributions in exchange for the right to retain an interest
in the reorganized debtor through a Plan confirmed by cram down. This doctrine may be
implicated in situations in which directors of mutual nonprofits attempt to confirm a Plan
over the objection of a class of impaired creditors, but a full analysis of the subject is outside
the scope of this Comment. For a more extensive explanation of the new value corollary and
its application, see generally Brunstad & Sigal, supra note lo.
46. See DOUGLAS G. BAiRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON
BANKRUPTCY 967 (2d ed. 199o).
47. See Horwitz, supra note 3, at 145 (remarking that nonprofits can be "stubbornly resistant to
classification").
48. See Hansmann, supra note 18, at 841-42.
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considerations generally militate in favor of the debtor and indicate that courts
ought to err on the side of accommodating an insolvent nonprofit's directors.
The issue of who manages a nonprofit debtor during its reorganization
presents problems that management of a for-profit debtor does not. In the for-
profit context, the interests of creditors and the interests of a company's
directors are better aligned because successful management of the firm as a
going concern means a higher likelihood that funds will be available to repay
creditors.49 Thus the creditors of an airline, for instance, have an interest in
making sure that the individuals running the airline are competent in the
airline business.
The interests of creditors and managers of a nonprofit overlap less. °
Because the purpose of a nonprofit organization is not necessarily to generate
earnings but rather to further a specific mission, the success of a nonprofit as a
going concern may actually reduce the assets available to creditors. Thus
creditors have an incentive to prevent control by even the most competent of
administrators, because such competency may not result in a Plan most
favorable to them."
Due to these special conflicts of interest, courts that are initially unable to
classify a nonprofit as either entrepreneurial or mutual face the task of
balancing the importance of allowing a nonprofit's directors to remain in place
against the importance of confirming a Plan that is consonant with the
bankruptcy objective of maximizing repayment of debts. In this situation, a
court might be tempted to defer to the general trend of societal support for
49. See In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 8o8 F.2d 363, 373 ( 5th Cir. 1987) ("A
principal goal of the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code is to benefit the
creditors of the Chapter 11 debtor by preserving going-concern values and thereby
enhancing the amounts recovered by all creditors."); Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of
theBankruptcy ReformAct of19 7 8, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47,53 (1997).
So. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, The Charity in Bankruptcy and Ghosts of Donors Past, Present, and
Future, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 471 (2005) (describing various charity law doctrines that
restrict the ability of nonprofit managers to utilize donations for repayment of creditors);
Jonathan C. Lipson, When Churches Fail: The Diocesan Debtor Dilemmas, 79 S. CAL. L. REv.
363, 400-01 (2006) (explaining that unlike for-profit debtors in possession, the leadership
of a religious nonprofit must balance the duties of their religious mission against their duties
to creditors).
51. This was precisely the frustration expressed by creditors in the case In re United Healthcare
System, Inc., No. 97-1159, 1997 WL 176574 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 1997), in which the directors of
a nonprofit debtor that operated a children's hospital decided to arrange a sale of the
hospital. Over the objection of creditors, the district court permitted the directors to reject
the bid of the buyer who offered the highest price, allowing them to accept instead the offer
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nonprofit enterprises, but this trend should not be construed to prevail over
section 1129's protection of creditors. While it is true, for example, that
statutory law 2 and common law 3 principles protect the charitable and social
missions of nonprofits, these advantages apply to entrepreneurial and mutual
nonprofits alike-yet mutual nonprofits can be found to violate the absolute
priority rule. 4
Instead, courts should use two independent factors to help determine the
manner in which a seemingly hybrid organization ought to be treated. First,
courts must consider whether refusing to allow the directors or members of a
nonprofit debtor to manage its operations would trigger any secondary
constitutional, federal, or state legal problems and, if so, should err on the side
of the debtor. Church parishes, for instance, should be treated as
entrepreneurial, despite the fact that many parishes are organized according to
a "corporation sole""5 structure that is unique to religious entities s6 and that
defies clear classification."7 This favorable treatment is preferable because
appointment of a secular trustee to manage the affairs of a nonsecular
organization risks violation of the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses. s8
52. These statutory advantages include tax exemption, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000), and protection
from involuntary bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2ooo).
53. These common law protections include the enforcement of charitable subscriptions, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (1981), and trust law doctrines that protect
certain donations from encroachment by creditors, see Brody, supra note 31.
54. See supra Section I.B.
55. A corporation sole is a one-person corporation, usually with power vested in a religious
leader, which provides for a corporation to be administered without a board of directors,
ownership shares, or other diffusion of control. A corporation sole, however, has a fiduciary
duty, and sometimes a canonical duty, not to operate the corporation for the benefit of the
sole. It is hotly debated whether this arrangement results in an equity-like interest or
whether the corporation sole merely holds property in trust for the benefit of the religious
group's members. See, e.g., In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane, 329 B.R. 304, 321 (Bankr. E.D.
Wash. 2005); Felicia Anne Nadborny, Note, "Leap of Faith" into Bankruptcy: An Examination
of the Issues Surrounding the Valuation of a Catholic Diocese's Bankruptcy Estate, 13 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REv. 839, 850-53 (2005); Allison Walsh Smith, Comment, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: A
New Battleground in the Ongoing Conflict Between Catholic Dioceses and Sex-Abuse Claimants,
84 N.C. L. REV. 282, 319-22 (2065).
56. One state, Arizona, technically permits the formation of a corporation sole for the secular
purpose of administering the property of a nonprofit scientific research institution. ARIz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-11901 (2001). But the vast majority of corporation soles in the United
States are organized for religious purposes. See Patty Gerstenblith, Associational Structures of
Religious Organizations, 1995 BYU L. REv. 439,454-58 & n.65 (1995).
57. See supra note 55.
s8. See Ryan J. Donohue, Comment, Thou Shalt Not Reorganize: Sacraments for Sale, 22 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 293, 323-24 (2005).
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Labor union debtors, to provide another example, may deserve deference in
cases where alternative unions or means of collective bargaining are unavailable
to workers. A strict application of section 1129 of the Code can create
complications under the National Labor Relations Act, 9 which states that
employees must be permitted to bargain through the representatives of their
choice - unsurprisingly, the representatives favored by creditors or a
bankruptcy court may not be the same as those preferred by employees.6"
A second factor that courts might weigh is whether the public policy
benefits achievable through a hybrid nonprofit's mission will be more desirable
from the perspective of overall equity than the policy benefits achieved through
maximizing repayment to creditors. This is an admittedly vague standard, and
the introduction of subjective value judgments to determine which nonprofit
debtors qualify risks a retreat toward the legal uncertainty that marks previous
absolute priority doctrine regarding nonprofit insolvency. Perhaps, therefore,
this factor should be utilized only in the most difficult of cases, to break the
proverbial "tie" in the event that an examination of organizational structure
and secondary legal conflicts has led a court to an impasse.
Nevertheless, there are many objective factors to which a court can look for
guidance in conducting its policy analysis. For instance, courts might consider
the role that a nonprofit has played in its target community, as measured by
the amount of money that the nonprofit has spent on charitable services, both
in absolute terms and as a percentage of its total operating costs.62
Similarly, a court might take into account the level of government and
public support for the type of organization in question by considering metrics
such as government funding and protective legislation. 6' Grants and protective
legislation for objectives like improved education and healthcare services far
outweigh similar support for, say, country club and fraternity activities. 64 On
59. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
6o. See, e.g., In re Gen. Teamsters, 265 F.3d 869, 874-75 (9 th Cir. 2001).
61. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Jack Needleman, The Role of Nonprofits in Health Care, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
1113, 1122 (2001). See generally ELLISON RESEARCH, AMERICANs' PERCEPTIONS OF THE
FINANCIAL EFFICIENCY OF NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (2008),
http://www.ellisonresearch.com/releases/o2o8_ERWhitePaper.pdf (presenting empirical
research that shows that most Americans think nonprofits spend an unreasonable amount of
their funds on overhead costs).
63. This approach must be pursued with caution, as it may be misleading in some contexts; for
example, government funding of certain religious activities is constitutionally prohibited.
64. Even when such education and healthcare entities become insolvent, it is not uncommon for
communities to intervene to provide financial and political support. E.g., In re Whittaker
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this basis, if a court examines an institution of higher education with both
entrepreneurial and mutual qualities, social welfare considerations may
reinforce the need for deference to the institution's incumbent management.
On the other hand, in the case of a structurally hybrid country club, a logical
result would be to find that post-petition retention of control by the club's
directors violates the absolute priority rule.
CONCLUSION
The application of absolute priority to nonprofit debtors has produced
contradictory court opinions. Underlying these cases is a judicial perspective so
distracted by the exoticism of nonprofit bankruptcies that it overlooks the
potential for their efficient administration. A nuanced legal framework can be
constructed by identifying a nonprofit's entrepreneurial or mutual qualities
and then by using those structural qualities as guideposts for an appropriate
application of section 1129 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. This approach
produces results that align with social and charitable policies as well as with the
bankruptcy system's overarching goal of preserving going concerns while
maximizing repayment of debts.
AMELIA RAWLS
Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n, 149 B.R. 812, 814 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993) (noting that community
leaders convinced a city government to forgive a $15o,ooo debt owed by the nonprofit
hospital debtor).
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